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Theoretical asset pricing models routinely assume that investors have heterogeneous information.
The goal of this paper is to establish the empirical relevance of this assumption for equilibrium asset prices and investor demands. To do so, we exploit a novel identification strategy which allows us to infer changes in the distribution of information among investors. Our results imply that information asymmetry has a substantial effect on prices and demands and that it affects assets through a liquidity channel.
Asymmetric-information asset pricing models typically rely on noisy rational expectations equilibria in which prices reveal the better-informed investors' information only partially due to randomness in the supply of the risky asset. Random supply might reflect the presence of 'noise traders' whose demands are independent of information. Prominent examples of such models include Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Hellwig (1980) , Admati (1985) , Wang (1993) , and Easley and O'Hara (2004) .
To derive empirical predictions representative of these models, Section I adapts the Grossman and Stiglitz model to show that an increase in information asymmetry leads to a fall in share price and a reduction in the uninformed investors' demand for the risky asset. Simple expressions for equilibrium prices reveal that the channel linking information asymmetry and price is liquidity risk: Price falls because the asset's exposure to liquidity risk increases. The model's comparative statics relate the changes in price and demand to the fraction of investors who are better informed, the supply of the asset, uncertainty about the asset's payoff, and the noisiness of the better-informed investors' signal.
Testing a model of asset pricing with asymmetric information poses a tricky identification challenge. Imagine regressing the change in investor demand on the change in a proxy for information asymmetry, such as the stock's bid-ask spread. Interpreting the coefficient would be hard if, as is likely, there are omitted variables (such as changes in the riskiness of the company's cash flows) which simultaneously affect bid-ask spreads and demand. Another problem is reverse causality. Spreads may increase precisely because demand is expected to fall. To overcome such simultaneity problems, we need an instrument for the degree of information asymmetry in the asset market.
The Grossman and Stiglitz model and its descendants suggest what such an instrument might look like: An exogenous change in the cost of information about an asset's future payoffs. These models demonstrate how an increase in information cost will increase information asymmetry by inducing fewer investors to purchase information. Exogeneity means, in this case, that the change in information cost must affect prices and demands only via its effect on the asymmetry of information.
The cost change would have to be independent of all other underlying determinants of asset prices and demands, particularly the asset's future payoffs.
Equity research analysts are among the most influential information producers in financial markets. We argue that their presence or absence affects the extent of information asymmetry. Suppose investors are heterogeneous in their information costs. All those whose costs exceed the price at which an analyst sells his research will purchase it. If the analyst were to stop selling research, investors would have to fall back on alternative information sources, and for some, the cost of becoming informed would exceed the benefit. (For instance, hedge funds or mutual funds likely have relatively low-cost substitute information sources, but retail investors presumably do not.) Thus, information asymmetry would increase following an analyst's departure.
Consider the extreme case of a market in which each stock is covered by exactly one analyst. The ideal experiment would be to randomly ban analysts from researching some stocks. Because the cost of information substitutes for buyers of analyst research must (weakly) exceed the analyst's asking price, the average cost of information would increase for the stocks that randomly lose research, and information asymmetry would increase as a result. An econometrician could then measure the effect of information asymmetry on equilibrium asset prices and investor demands.
Our empirical approach is to identify a quasi-experiment of this nature. We compile a list of events in which brokerage firms terminated research coverage of large sets of stocks. These coverage terminations will qualify as a valid instrument only if they satisfy two conditions. First, they must correlate with an increase in information asymmetry. This will be the case if information costs are heterogeneous, as we have argued. Second, they must affect price and demand only through their effect on information asymmetry. Most coverage terminations do not satisfy this exclusion restriction. Instead, they typically reflect a deterioration in the analyst's view of the company's future prospects and so are endogenous (McNichols and O'Brien (1997) ). However, we are able to identify a subset of 14,939 coverage terminations over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] that are plausibly exogenous in the sense that they result from closures or downsizing of brokerage firms' research operations, rather than an analyst's decision to selectively drop coverage on some stocks but continue it on others. 1 We discuss the exogenous shocks that led to this restructuring in Section II, where we also show that sample terminations correlate with increases in information asymmetry while passing various tests of the exclusion restriction, as required for exogeneity. 2, 3 We test the model's predictions in Section III. As predicted, both price and uninformed demand fall following a coverage termination. Cumulative abnormal returns average between −51 and −56 basis points on the day of an exogenous coverage termination, depending on the benchmark. Institutional investors-which are more likely to be better informed-increase their holdings of affected stocks while retail investors-who are more likely to be uninformed-sell. Cross-sectional tests support the comparative statics. Prices and uninformed demand experience larger declines, the more investors are uninformed, the larger and more variable is turnover, the more uncertain is the asset's payoff, and the noisier is the signal. Finally, using standard empirical models of expected returns, we show that the loading on a factor proxying for liquidity risk increases following exogenous coverage terminations.
This supports the liquidity-risk channel of the model.
Our tests contribute to the literature by providing direct evidence of the role of asymmetric information in asset pricing. With one notable exception, discussed below, the literature has instead mainly focused on the role of liquidity in asset pricing, perhaps because liquidity is considerably easier to measure than information asymmetry. Relevant empirical studies include Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Amihud (2002) , Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) , Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) , Jones (2002), and Eleswarapu (1997) . Following theoretical models such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Huang (2003) , these studies treat liquidity as exogenous. Our findings suggest that liquidity varies with information asymmetry, consistent with microstructure models such as Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) . Thus, one fundamental driver of asset prices appears to be information asymmetry, consistent with the models of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Hellwig (1980) , Admati (1985) , Wang (1993), and Easley and O'Hara (2004) .
The notable exception is the empirical literature that uses Easley and O'Hara's (1992) PIN measure to proxy for information asymmetry. PIN is based on the idea that the presence of privately informed traders can be noisily inferred from order flow imbalances. Easley et al. (1996) show that PIN correlates with measures of liquidity such as bid-ask spreads, while Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) find that PIN affects expected returns. 4 The advantage of our approach relative to this literature is that it exploits exogenous variation in information asymmetry rather than relying on a proxy for information asymmetry whose potential correlations with unobserved variables are unknown.
I. The Model
The setup follows Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . There is a unit mass of investors who have identical initial wealth, W 0 , and are risk-averse with CARA utility of consumption −e −C . 5 Investors trade in period 1 and consume in period 2. There is a risk-free asset with gross return R and a risky asset with aggregate supply X ∼ N (X, σ 2 x ) and payoff u = θ + η, with η ∼ N (0, σ 2 u ). Investors know θ and can engage in research at cost c > 0 which results in a noisy signal s about the risky asset's payoff
. When investor i observes the signal, his information set, Duarte and Young (2008) show that PIN is only priced to the extent that it proxies for illiquidity.
5 The risk aversion coefficient is assumed equal to unity for simplicity and without loss of generality.
s is not observed, P contains useful conditioning information for payoff u.
In addition to the investors, there may or may not be an analyst, working for a brokerage firm, who can also produce signal s. For simplicity, we assume the analyst disseminates s (in the form of earnings forecasts, research reports, or trading recommendations) for free. This mirrors institutional practice: Investors are not charged for each analyst report they receive, so at the margin, the cost of observing the analyst's signal is zero. Brokers recoup the cost of producing research through account fees, trading commissions, or cross-subsidies from market-making or investment banking. 6
In the analyst's presence, s is public information, so information is symmetric. In his absence, we are in the Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) world where investors must decide whether to produce the signal privately. Grossman and Stiglitz show that in equilibrium, some fraction 0 < δ < 1 of the investors pay to acquire the signal. Thus, in the analyst's absence, information is asymmetric.
Investors do not observe aggregate supply X. The three random variables of the model (X, η, and v) are assumed to be independent.
A. Equilibrium Effects
To determine the equilibrium effects of a coverage termination, we compare prices and demands for the risky asset in the symmetric information case, which results from an analyst's presence, to the asymmetric information case that occurs in the analyst's absence. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium changes when the analyst ceases to produce research on the asset. 
as uninformed investors sell. Privately informed investors increase their demand for the risky asset by the amount
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Discussion
CARA utility combined with Gaussian random variables implies that investors optimize their demands by trading off mean and variance conditional on their information set. (For details, see Appendix A.)
A coverage termination affects only the information set of investors who decide not to produce the signal themselves. From their perspective, a coverage termination increases the conditional payoff variance while having a mean zero effect on their expected payoff. This lowers uninformed demand and thus equilibrium price. At a lower price, privately informed investors, whose payoff beliefs are unchanged, are induced to increase their demand until the market-clearing condition is satisfied.
Why does payoff uncertainty increase from the perspective of the uninformed? In the analyst's absence, the uninformed do not observe s and so base their demand solely on the observed price, P . However, P is not fully revealing, because investors do not observe aggregate supply, X. As a result, the uninformed cannot simply back out the informed investors' signal from observed prices; they cannot tell whether a price change reflects a change in aggregate supply or a change in the signal.
Instead, they noisily infer the signal by forming an expectation of payoff u conditional on observed price P . Thus, a coverage termination exposes the uninformed to aggregate supply risk.
More formally, Appendix A shows that, under rational expectations, both the symmetric and asymmetric-information equilibrium prices are linear in the signal and in aggregate supply:
where c 2 > 0 and c 3 < 0 (the precise expressions can be found in Appendix A). Following Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Amihud (2002), we can interpret X as trade volume and the coefficient on X as the price impact of trade. Note that trades have a price impact even if information is symmetric, as long as the payoff is uncertain. This follows from risk aversion.
As the following corollary shows, the effect of a coverage termination is to increase the price impact of trade: 
Corollary 1 says that price falls as information asymmetry increases because price becomes more sensitive to aggregate-supply or liquidity risk. Thus, we have:
Corollary 2: Following a coverage termination, the asset's expected return increases as the asset's exposure to liquidity risk increases.
In a factor-model setting, for instance, we would thus expect the loading on a factor proxying for liquidity risk to increase following an exogenous coverage termination.
C. Robustness
In common with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , our model makes two simplifying assumptions: There is a single risky asset, and there is a single signal s which, in our setting, can be produced by both the analyst and investors. Neither assumption is restrictive. Finally, we note that it is straightforward to recast the analysis within the Kyle (1985) setup.
This would leave Proposition 1, the corollaries, and the comparative statics discussed in the next section qualitatively unchanged. What we call the change in the price impact of trade in Corollary 1 would be analogous to the change in Kyle's λ. We prefer the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) setting because a coverage termination effectively increases the cost of information, which in their model is explicitly linked to the fraction of informed investors and thus to equilibrium prices and demand. In Kyle, on the other hand, the distribution of information is exogenous.
D. Testable Implications
To guide our empirical analysis, we derive the following comparative statics.
The more investors become privately informed following a coverage termination, the fewer investors are affected by the loss of analyst information. Thus, we have: 
Corollary 1 states that a coverage termination increases the (negative) sensitivity of price to aggregate supply because the uninformed have a harder time filtering the signal from the price.
Thus, stocks with larger aggregate supply experience larger price and demand changes:
The greater is mean aggregate supply, the larger is the negative price impact of a coverage termination and the greater is the resulting increase in informed demand for the stock:
In the absence of an analyst, the uninformed infer the signal from the observed price. This inference problem is harder the more variable are the aggregate supply and payoff, which in turn increases the value of analyst research to the uninformed. Thus, we have the following implications:
The more variable is aggregate supply, the larger is the negative price impact of a coverage termination and the greater is the resulting increase in informed demand for the stock: 
The effect of signal noise is more complicated. Consider the two extreme cases. If the signal is very precise, the uninformed can filter the signal from the observed price very effectively, so losing the signal has a negligible impact on demand and prices. If the signal is so noisy as to be essentially uninformative, the informed have little informational advantage over the uninformed. As a result, a coverage termination results in negligible information asymmetry among investors and so has little impact on demand and prices. In between these two extremes, losing a noisy but informative analyst signal increases the uninformed investors' inference problem and so leads to a price fall and a decrease in uninformed demand. Thus, we have: 
II. Identification
Identification of the effects of an increase in information asymmetry on asset prices and investor demands requires an instrument. To satisfy the exclusion restriction, the instrument must correlate with an increase in information asymmetry but must not otherwise correlate with price or demand.
As McNichols and O'Brien (1997) "We're withdrawing from businesses in which we're strategically ill-positioned and cannot create a sustainable profit stream, whether the market turns around or not." (Chicago Tribune, March 26, 2002) Regional broker George K. Baum closed its capital markets division in October 2000, blaming lack of profitability even during the booming late 1990s:
"Neither the retail brokerage nor equity capital markets divisions made money in the past two years." (Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, Oct. 13, 2000)
We identify the stocks affected by the 20 brokerage closures using the coverage table of Reuters
Estimates, which lists, for each stock, the dates during which each broker and analyst in the Reuters database actively cover a stock. When dating the terminations, we use the time stamp of the first press release announcing the brokerage closure. This allows us to pinpoint the precise trading day on which investors could first react to the news.
A.2. Sector Terminations
To generate a viable sample size, we widen our search beyond brokerage closures. While 20 brokers had covered, namely metals/mining, life sciences, utilities, healthcare services, airlines, industrials, specialty chemicals, and telecom equipment/wireless. We ignore individual-analyst departures and focus instead on sector terminations to reduce the likelihood that brokers selectively fired analysts whose stocks had poor future prospects (which could violate the exclusion restriction). Of course, even sector terminations may be information-driven, but later in this section we report evidence suggesting that sector terminations reflect broker-specific concerns rather than sector performance.
To identify sector terminations, we first search the Reuters coverage table for days on which a brokerage firm terminates coverage of at least 75% of the stocks it had been covering in a sector. As
Reuters has no information on the sector definition each broker uses, we define sectors using S&P's six-digit GICS codes. 9 We do not impose a 100% termination rate within a GICS sector to allow for the possibility that GICS do not coincide precisely with a given broker's sector definition; 10 our results are not sensitive to this. In addition, we search in Factiva and Bloomberg for announcements of sector terminations not already identified in the Reuters data. Finally, we mine three text archives of analyst reports (Investext, Thomson One, and the client-intranet of a large brokerage house) for client notices announcing sector terminations. 11 Such termination notices are mandatory under NYSE Rule 472(f)(5) and NASD Rule 2711(f)(5) which require that:
"[A] member provide notice to customers that it is terminating research coverage of an issuer that is the subject of a research report. . . .
[I]f the research analyst covering the subject company has left the member, or where the member has terminated coverage on an industry or sector . . . the rationale for termination will be required." The broker must give notice "... using the means of dissemination equivalent to those it ordinarily uses to provide the customer with its research reports." 12
Under these rules, the broker has an obligation to notify its clients when terminating coverage. Thus, brokerage firms cannot terminate coverage secretly. In fact, the news is quickly disseminated to the wider market. We find that the Dow Jones marketwatch.com service typically reports news of coverage terminations within no more than a day of a termination notice. Moreover, marketwatch.com provides a synopsis of the broker's reason for termination, allowing even non-clients to infer whether a stock was terminated for endogenous or exogenous reasons. Thus, both brokerage closures and sector coverage terminations are publicly observable events.
There is considerable overlap between the sector terminations identified from Reuters, the news reports, and the text archives. In the rare instances where the sources disagree on announcement dates, we choose the earliest one. For news reports and for many of the termination notices from the forecasted and realized growth rates, R&D expenditures, and various key financial ratios." There are currently 68 GICS sectors at the six-digit level. See www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/xls/index/gics map aug2008.xls. 10 Suppose some oil & gas stocks (GICS code 101020) are covered by the energy team. If the broker fires the oil & gas team but not the energy team, we will observe less than 100% of the oil & gas GICS coverage being terminated.
11 Search terms used include: "Terminate/discontinue/withdraw/cease/drop coverage", "Not rated", and "Not covered". The vast majority of termination notices identified this way relate to individual companies (not sectors) which are dropped for endogenous-sounding reasons, such as "The company no longer fits with our core investment objectives and coverage universe;" "owing to potential bankruptcy proceedings;" or "because of the company's relatively low institutional ownership, low retail interest, and low trading volume." We do not include such terminations in our sample as they likely violate the exclusion restriction.
12 The first quote is from http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48252.htm. The second quote is from http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display main.html?rbid=2403&element id=3675.
text archives, we have time stamps and so can pinpoint announcements with great precision. 13
A.3. Sample
Combining the brokerage-closure and sector terminations yields 21,782 candidate stocks that are hit with a coverage termination in 2000-2005. We then apply the following filters. First, using CRSP delisting codes, we remove 434 stocks that were involuntarily delisted from an exchange within three months of a termination. Second, we remove 5,396 terminations that were followed by a reinitiation by the same analyst at a new employer, or by a different analyst at the original brokerage firm, within three months of a termination. 14 Finally, we exclude 528 real-estate investment trusts (REITs), 326
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), 80 non-common stocks and closed-end funds (i.e., CRSP share codes > 12), and 79 companies without valid identifiers in CRSP. In 1,347 cases, the termination left a stock without any analyst coverage. We refer to these as orphaned stocks. Table I compares summary statistics for the stocks in our sample to the CRSP universe of publicly traded U.S. stocks and to the universe of U.S. stocks covered by at least one brokerage firm according to Reuters Estimates or I/B/E/S. Sample stocks -like Reuters and I/B/E/S stocks more generally -are on average larger, more liquid, and less volatile than the average stock in the CRSP universe.
On average, 6.4 analysts covered a sample stock before a coverage termination, in line with stocks in 13 We deliberately do not use data from I/B/E/S or First Call to determine termination dates. Ellul and Panayides (2007) , who do, comment: "The date that we use is the one when the last estimate of the EPS estimate is recorded by either I/B/E/S and/or FirstCall. In practice, this is the date when the analyst's report is communicated to I/B/E/S and FirstCall. It is not necessarily the date when the analyst's report is published." Kecskes and Womack (2007) face a similar problem, and resort to conducting an event study at an annual frequency. The Reuters Estimates coverage table, news reports, and termination notices we use do not suffer from this shortcoming.
14 If clients know, or believe, that coverage will shortly be re-initiated, the expected change in information asymmetry may be negligible. The data bear this out: The average share price fall for the 5,396 reinitiations we screened out is one-tenth the size of the average share price fall in our final sample. 15 We identify the analyst covering the stock from the name on the termination notice or the Reuters coverage table where available, or else from the I/B/E/S earnings forecast database.
the Reuters and I/B/E/S databases. Overall, the average sample firm looks similar to the average firm in Reuters and I/B/E/S, in terms of size, liquidity, volatility, and prior analyst coverage.
B. Do Coverage Terminations Increase Information Asymmetry?
Identification requires that coverage terminations increase information asymmetry among investors.
We use four popular empirical measures to proxy for information asymmetry: Easley et al. 's (1997) probability of informed trading (PIN ), bid-ask spreads, Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure, and Lesmond et al.'s (1999) illiquidity measure based on stale returns. We also examine changes in earnings surprises and return volatilities at earnings releases around coverage terminations. 16 Throughout, we use difference-in-difference tests to help remove biases due to omitted variables or secular trends affecting similar companies at the same time (Ashenfelter and Card (1985) ). For instance, bid-ask spreads may fall over time due to decimalization or competition from other exchanges or electronic communication networks (ECNs), obscuring the effect of the termination treatment. To remove common influences, difference-in-difference tests compare the change in a variable of interest for treated firms to the contemporaneous change for a set of control firms matched to have similar characteristics but which are themselves unaffected by the treatment.
Given our focus on asset pricing, we follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2007) and match firms on the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) pricing factors using the Daniel et al. (1997) algorithm.
Specifically, we randomly choose as controls for firm i five unique firms in the same size, book-tomarket, and momentum quintile in the month of June prior to a coverage termination, subject to the condition that control firms did not themselves experience a termination in the quarter before and after the event. In view of the evidence from Table I that firms with analyst coverage are larger and more liquid than CRSP firms in general, we also require that controls must be covered by one or more analysts in the three months before the event. Stephen Brown (see Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004) ). Net of the change among control firms, PIN increases on average by 1.6% between the quarter before a termination and the quarter after.
B.1. Results
Even though PIN data are only available quarterly, this result is quite precisely estimated, with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.002. 17
Panel B reports changes in bid-ask spreads around coverage terminations. (This and the next two statistics are computed from daily data over either six-or 12-month estimation windows ending 10 days before and starting 10 days after a termination announcement.) Spreads decline for both sample and control stocks, presumably reflecting the benign effects of decimalization etc., but they decline more slowly for sample stocks. As a result, the difference-in-difference tests show that bid-ask spreads increase relative to control stocks following coverage termination, by around 3.3% (p = 0.002 or better). This is consistent with an increase in information asymmetry.
Wang (1994) predicts that the correlation between absolute return and dollar volume increases in information asymmetry. This makes Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure (AIM ) a natural proxy for information asymmetry, for it is defined as the log ratio of absolute return and dollar volume. Panel C reports changes in AIM. For the six-month window, AIM averages −3.892 before and −3.966 after a coverage termination, implying that the correlation between absolute return and volume decreases.
The difference-in-difference statistic, on the other hand, averages 0.046 (p < 0.001), implying an increase in information asymmetry following coverage terminations. 18 The 12-month estimate is similarly positive, averaging 0.075 (p < 0.001). These estimates correspond to a 1.2% and 1.9% average increase in AIM, respectively.
An alternative measure of illiquidity is due to Lesmond et al. (1999) . A large number of zeroreturn or missing-return days in a given estimation window may indicate an illiquid stock. Panel D shows that this number increases significantly following a coverage termination, by 7.1% and 13.1% on average net of the control-firm change measured over six-and 12-month windows, respectively.
Panel E focuses on earnings announcements. Following coverage terminations, we expect returns to be more volatile around earnings announcements as more uncertainty is left unresolved (West (1988) ).
We also expect greater absolute earnings surprises, to the extent that post-termination consensus forecasts reflect coarser information sets. We find that log daily return volatility in the three days around earnings announcements increases by 2% net of the change among control firms (p < 0.001), while the average magnitude of absolute earnings surprises increases by 10.8% (p < 0.001).
B.2. Robustness
The evidence in Table II is consistent with the interpretation that information asymmetry increases following coverage terminations. Thus, our terminations sample appears to satisfy the first of the two conditions for identification. Before we turn to the second, we briefly discuss untabulated results for the subsample of closure-related terminations and for orphaned stocks. Closure-related terminations behave just like the sample overall, with similar-sized changes in the information asymmetry proxies.
In the case of orphans, we find larger changes, indicating that these suffer the greatest increase in information asymmetry. To illustrate, AIM increases by between 17.1% and 24.7% when a stock becomes an orphan, while average bid-ask spreads widen by between 4.5% to 5.1%.
C. Are Sample Terminations Exogenous?

C.1. Brokerage Closures
Closure-related terminations satisfy the exclusion restriction unless brokerage firms closed their research departments because their analysts had negative private signals about the stocks they covered.
In view of the quotes in Section II.A.1., it seems more likely that brokerage firms quit research for strategic and financial reasons (often in the context of withdrawing from investment banking more generally) than to mask negative news about companies their analysts covered.
C.2. Sector Terminations
Sector terminations are potentially trickier. The exclusion restriction would be violated if brokers systematically chose to terminate sectors whose characteristics correlate with variables of interest, such as value or demand. Whether they do so is an empirical question we can test.
We model a brokerage firm's choice of which sectors to stop covering at time t using McFadden's (1974) choice model. For each broker, the choice set from which sector terminations are drawn includes all sectors the broker covers at time t. The unit of analysis is hence a broker-sector pair.
The dependent variable equals one if a sector is chosen for termination and zero otherwise. To be included in the estimation sample, we require that the brokerage firm drop at least one sector at time t (so we model the choice of which sectors are terminated conditional on the brokerage firm's decision to restructure). We exclude brokerage firms that close down their research departments altogether (i.e., those that terminate every sector they cover).
Brokers are assumed to drop those sectors whose termination will maximize their expected profit.
We parameterize expected profit as a function of sector performance (namely, prior and future sector returns and prior and future sector earnings surprises); sector characteristics (return volatility, a proxy for competition from other brokers, and two proxies for the revenue a sector generates for that particular brokerage firm by way of trading commissions and investment banking fees); and analyst characteristics (an Institutional Investor 'all-star' indicator, the analyst's forecast accuracy relative to his sector-matched peers at other brokerage firms, his experience, and his tenure with the broker).
The precise variable definitions can be found in Table III. The model is estimated using probit without (column 1) or with random brokerage-firm effects (column 2). We find no evidence that brokers terminate sectors with poor past or poor anticipated stock performance. The same goes for earnings surprises: Brokers do not terminate sectors whose earnings have recently disappointed, nor do they terminate sectors whose subsequent earnings fall short of consensus. The coefficient estimates are not only statistically insignificant, they are also economically small, as the marginal effects in Table III indicate. These results suggest that sector termination choices are not information-driven. Instead, brokers are significantly more likely to drop sectors in which they earn low commission or investment banking revenue as well as those covered by inexperienced, recently hired, unrated analysts with poor forecasting records. 19 In other words, sector terminations reflect broker-specific concerns rather than sector performance.
C.3. Do Terminations Forecast Future Performance Changes?
As a further test of the exclusion restriction, we test directly whether sample terminations are uninformative about the affected stocks' future prospects, as required for identification. Suppose a broker terminates coverage at time t. If this signals private information about the stock, we should be able to predict its future performance from the fact that coverage was terminated.
Testing this requires an assumption about the nature of the signal. Assume that it is negative information about t + 1 earnings that is not yet reflected in the consensus earnings forecast dated t − 1 (i.e., before other analysts knew of the coverage termination). When earnings are eventually announced, they will fall short of the t − 1 consensus, resulting in a negative earnings surprise. If, on the other hand, the termination is exogenous, earnings will not differ systematically from consensus.
This test is more powerful than simply checking whether terminations forecast changes in operating performance (such as return on assets, ROA). By conditioning on consensus, the test explicitly exploits differences in the analyst's and the market's information sets under the null that the analyst has negative private information. Earnings surprises are ideal in this context because they are based on an observable forecast: surprise t+1 = EP S t+1 − E[EP S t+1 |consensus info t−1 ]. For other measures of operating performance, such as ROA, the market's forecast is unobservable and must be estimated by the econometrician, which introduces noise and decreases the test's power. We control for lagged returns and return volatility measured over the prior 12 months, the log number of brokers covering the stock, and year effects. We also add firm fixed effects to control for omitted firm characteristics and allow for auto-correlation in quarterly earnings surprises using Baltagi and Wu's (1999) AR (1) sample termination + year effects
The firm fixed effects are jointly significant with an F -statistic of 3.35, and earnings surprises are significantly auto-correlated, with ρ = 0.3. Standard errors are shown below the coefficients.
As expected, earnings surprises are significantly more negative following 'endogenous' terminations (p = 0.009). On average, a non-sector termination is followed by a quarterly earnings surprise that is 17.1% more negative than the sample average over this period. The 14,939 sample terminations, by contrast, are neither economically nor statistically related to subsequent earnings surprises (p = 0.570). This is consistent with sample terminations being uninformative and thus exogenous. 20 We actually identify 53,092 non-sector terminations from the Reuters coverage table. However, there is substantial clustering among these non-sector terminations, in the sense that multiple brokers drop coverage of the same stock at or around the same time. (Such within-stock clustering suggests that these 53,092 non-sector terminations are indeed likely endogenous. In contrast, our 14,939 'exogenous' sample terminations cluster within-broker-not surprisingly-but not within-stock.) Overall, there are one or more non-sector terminations in 16,354 of the 65,629 firm-quarters. 21 We obtain qualitatively similar (and slightly stronger) results in a simple auto-regressive OLS specification.
III. The Effect of Information Asymmetry on Price and Demand
A. Change in Price
To test the first part of Proposition 1, we compute cumulative abnormal returns ( Consistent with Proposition 1, price falls following the announcement of a coverage termination.
For the sample as a whole, average CARs range from −51 to −71 basis points (not annualized). For the median sample firm, the price fall implies a fall in market value of between $1.8 and $2.1 million.
Could confounding events be driving this result? If our terminations are truly exogenous, we effectively have a randomized trial and so controls for confounding events are superfluous. Analysis of one particular confounding event, namely coincident negative earnings surprises, illustrates. There are about as few coincident negative earnings surprises as chance alone would predict. When these are excluded, average CARs range from −47 to −60 basis points, barely changing the result.
In the subsample of closure-related terminations, CARs are more negative than in the sample as a whole, averaging between −1.14% and −4.02% depending on the benchmark and time window.
Stratified by coverage, CARs increase monotonically (become less negative) the more brokers continue to cover a stock. To illustrate, over the [-1,0] interval, orphaned stocks lose 99 basis points in the market model, while stocks covered by more than 15 other analysts lose only 35 basis points.
This suggests that the degree of information asymmetry decreases in the extent of analyst coverage.
Though not shown, we find no evidence that these price falls are temporary. After one month, for instance, CARs still average −47 basis points (p = 0.027).
B. Changes in Demand
According to Proposition 1, investors who choose to become privately informed following a coverage termination increase their holdings while those who become uninformed sell. Although we cannot identify directly who becomes privately informed, it seems plausible that retail investors are less likely to produce their own research than are institutional investors, which not only likely have a cost advantage in producing research themselves but often also maintain trading accounts with multiple brokerage firms and so face a relatively smaller loss of analyst information to begin with. We thus assume that a larger fraction of institutions than of retail investors becomes privately informed. 22
Unfortunately, we have no high-frequency trading data to estimate changes in institutional and retail demand. 23 Instead, we use the quarterly CDA/Spectrum data to compute the change in the fraction of a sample company's outstanding stock held by institutions required to file 13f reports. 24
Clearly, use of quarterly data will generate coarser results than those discussed in the previous section.
Panel A of Table V shows that 13f filers as a group increase their holdings from 61.9% to 62.9% of shares outstanding following the average termination (p < 0.001). Net of the contemporaneous change in control firms, the average increase is 0.9 percentage points (p < 0.001). Thus, 13f institutions are unusually large net buyers following terminations. If institutions are more likely to generate their own research than are retail investors, this result is consistent with Proposition 1.
For robustness, Panel B provides similar evidence for the subsample of closure-related terminations. Panel C shows a breakdown of the mean net changes in institutional holdings by the number of 22 In an auxiliary test, we compare the price impact of sample terminations at two types of brokerage firms: Those that serve both retail and institutional investors, and those that serve only institutional investors. (Brokers are classified based on information from the annual Factbook of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.) Announcementday CARs are significantly lower for terminations at institution-only brokers, averaging −18 basis points, vs. −61 basis points for retail-only brokers (using the three-factor model). This is consistent with our assumption that institutions are less affected by coverage terminations.
23 Trade size is sometimes used to infer retail trades, but decimalization in January 2001 and the growth in algorithmic trading mean that small trades are no longer viewed as a good proxy for retail trades.
24 Investment companies and professional money managers with over $100 million under management are required to file quarterly 13f reports. Reports may omit holdings of fewer than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value.
brokers covering the stock. While not monotonic, institutional holdings increase the most, and retail holdings decrease the most, when coverage drops to zero. 25
C. Testing the Comparative Statics: Price
To test the price-related comparative statics in Implications 1 through 4, we regress Fama-French announcement-day CARs on proxies for the five parameters of the model: δ (the fraction of informed investors),X (mean aggregate supply), σ 2 x (aggregate supply uncertainty), σ 2 u (payoff uncertainty), and σ 2 v (signal noise). 26 We also control for whether the termination coincides with a negative earnings surprise and for announcement-quarter effects.
Our main proxy for δ is the fraction of the company's stock held by institutional investors; call it ϕ. We do not claim that every institution will choose to become informed (i.e., that δ = ϕ). For the proxy to work, we only require that δ correlate positively with ϕ. This will be the case if institutions are more likely to become informed than retail investors, as argued earlier.
We use the first two moments of the distribution of log daily share turnover to proxy forX and σ 2 x . 27 The proxy for payoff uncertainty σ 2 u is the standard deviation of the year-on-year growth rate in quarterly earnings per share. We parameterize signal noise σ 2 v as a function of the number of other analysts covering the stock and the quality of the analyst whose coverage is lost. Stocks covered by fewer analysts should have noisier signals, while high-quality analysts presumably produce more informative signals, so their coverage terminations should lead to larger price falls.
Table VI reports the results. All coefficients in column 1 have the predicted sign and are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Price falls are larger, the smaller are institutional holdings, the larger and more variable is turnover, the more volatile is earnings growth, the fewer analysts remain to cover the stock, and for terminations involving all-stars or more experienced analysts or those with high relative forecast accuracy. Economically, the largest effect is ∂∆EP/∂X. A one 25 Xu (2006) finds that institutions reduce their ownership of orphaned stocks in a sample that does not screen out endogenous terminations. Xu's finding is consistent with the view that endogenous terminations are implicit sells.
26 Results are robust to using market-model CARs and alternative estimation windows. 27 An alternative proxy for X may be log free float. We prefer turnover because float captures the maximum possible supply while mean turnover better captures the typical supply actually observed. standard deviation increase in our proxy forX is associated with a fall in price of 27 basis points, all else equal. The smallest effect is ∂∆EP/∂σ 2 u (−6.1 basis points).
Our findings are robust to restricting the sample to closure-related terminations (column 2). All signs are unchanged and the economic magnitude of each effect is stronger (with the exception of the extent of coverage by other brokers, which loses statistical insignificance).
Column 3 uses the whole sample and adds the size of the brokerage firm's retail and institutional sales forces as further proxies for (1 − δ) and δ, respectively. Interestingly, only the size of the retail sales force appears to matter: The larger the retail sales force, the more negative the price change (p = 0.004); a one standard deviation increase (say, from Ladenburg, Thalman to Prudential Securities) is associated with an 8.6 basis point lower CAR. The fact that the size of the broker's institutional sales force has no effect supports our assumption that retail investors are more sensitive to changes in research coverage while institutions are more likely to stay informed some other way.
Recall that Implication 4 predicts a U-shaped relation between ∆EP and signal noise. In column 4, we add the level and square of analyst forecast dispersion as further proxies for σ 2 v . The data provide some support for a U-shaped relation: The coefficient for the level of forecast dispersion is negative (p = 0.036) while that for the squared term is positive (p = 0.012). However, the implied minimum is in the far right tail of the empirical distribution of forecast dispersion, so as a practical matter, in our data, ∆EP decreases in all our proxies for signal noise.
D. Testing the Comparative Statics: Demands
To test the demand-related comparative statics in Implications 1 through 4, we estimate the same four specifications as in the previous section but use the difference-in-difference change in institutional holdings as the dependent variable. This is defined as in Section III.B and is intended to proxy for the change in informed demand, ∆EID.
The results, shown in force has no effect. Adding forecast dispersion and its square (in column 4) provides support for the predicted hump-shaped relation between changes in informed demand and signal noise.
Our results for changes in demand are generally noisier than those for changes in price. This is not surprising, given the quarterly nature of the 13f institutional ownership data. We view these results as encouraging. However, given the data limitations, they should be interpreted with caution.
E. Testing Corollary 2: Change in Expected Returns
Falling prices following an increase in information asymmetry suggest that investors' expected returns have increased. Corollary 2 states that expected returns increase because affected stocks become more sensitive to liquidity risk. To test this prediction, we estimate the following model:
where r e i,t is stock i's month-t return in excess of the riskfree rate; I t∈P ost is an indicator for the postevent period; I i∈T erm identifies firms in the termination sample (as opposed to matched controls, selected as before); and F actors t is a vector which includes the three Fama-French factors (M KT , SM B, and HM L) and a liquidity factor, LIQ. 28 We use LIQ to proxy for liquidity risk. Table VIII reports results for three alternative versions of LIQ: Sadka's (2006) Regression (7) allows us to measure whether a stock's factor loadings change following a coverage 28 We do not include Carhart's (1997) momentum factor because several studies find that momentum is largely driven by liquidity, which is our focus. See Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006) . termination, compared to otherwise similar control firms which experience no termination. This effect is captured by the difference-in-differences term, ∆β P ost&T erm i
. To estimate the model, we impose the restriction that ∆β P ost i and ∆β
P ost&T erm i
are common to all firms and use a two-step approach analogous to that of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) ; the details of the estimation can be found in Table VIII . 29 The model is estimated with monthly data using 12-, 18-, or 24-month windows ending the month before a termination or beginning one month after.
The results in Table VIII The overall effect of the changes in factor loadings is to increase the expected returns of stocks experiencing coverage terminations. For example, using mean factor return realizations for our sample period, the changes in coefficients in Panel A imply that expected returns increase by between 14 and 44 basis points a year. 30 29 Like theirs, ours is a system of return equations for thousands of firms with time-varying factor loadings. Pastor and Stambaugh's cross-equation parameter restrictions allow us to reduce the parameterization of the model and increase the precision of the estimates in a computationally efficient way. See Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, p. 665) for details. 30 The increase in expected returns implies that realized post-termination returns will exceed a benchmark that fails to account for the factor loading changes. In other words, unless the benchmark is suitably adjusted, firms experiencing
IV. Conclusion
Asset pricing models routinely assume that investors have heterogeneous information, but it is an open empirical question how important information asymmetry really is for asset prices. This paper provides direct evidence of the effect of information asymmetry on asset prices and investor demands using plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of information.
The variation we exploit is caused by the closure or restructuring of brokerage firms' research operations between 2000 and 2005, which led to analyst coverage of thousands of stocks being terminated for reasons that we argue were unrelated to the stocks' future prospects. Following such exogenous coverage terminations, information asymmetry increased (proxied by a range of standard measures such as bid-ask spreads), while share prices and uninformed (i.e., retail) investors' demands fell. Consistent with the comparative statics of a Grossman and Stiglitz-type model, we find that the falls in price and uninformed demand are larger, the more investors are uninformed; the larger and more variable is turnover; the more uncertain is the asset's payoff; and the noisier is the betterinformed investors' signal. We show theoretically that prices fall because expected returns become more sensitive to liquidity risk and provide empirical support for this prediction. We discuss why liquidity risk is undiversifiable in the presence of multiple assets.
In sum, our results imply that information asymmetry has a substantial effect on asset prices and that a primary channel linking asymmetry to prices is liquidity. We believe that our quasi-experiment can serve as a useful instrument for empirical work in other applications that examines the effects of information asymmetry in financial markets. In this spirit, we intend to make our set of exogenous coverage terminations available to fellow researchers. 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
In all cases, investor i solves
whereD i is investor i's demand for the risky asset, and subscript i denotes whether or not the investor observes the signal. Optimal demand is therefore given by
where V [u|F i ] denotes the variance of payoff u conditional on information set F i .
Case 1: Symmetric Information
An informed investor's expectation for the risky asset payoff is
while the variance of u conditional on the signal is
The current case assumes symmetry with all investors informed. The market-clearing condition equates total optimal demand under symmetric information with total supply, D inf ormed = X, implying
Case 2: Asymmetric Information In the absence of an analyst, a fraction δ of the investors pay c to obtain the payoff signal s. The proof for 0 < δ < 1 is immediate from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . Uninformed investors base their demand solely on the observed price. To do this, they must filter from the price a noisy inference of the informed investors' signal. Under rational expectations, the uninformed know the price is linear in the informed investors' signal and the asset's supply, that is,
This price is a conjecture to be verified in equilibrium, at which point we also solve for the constants c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 . The conditional moments of u given an uninformed investor's information set are:
When a fraction δ of investors are informed, the equilibrium price is found from the market-clearing condition δD inf ormed + (1 − δ)D uninf ormed = X, giving
We can use conditional moments (15) and (16) to show that P asymm is indeed linear in the informed investors' signal and the asset's supply. Matching coefficients in (14) and (17) gives
Finally, we can write c 1 as a function of c 2 and c 3 :
The expressions shown in Proposition 1 follow directly from using these solutions in the price and demand expressions, and noting that the unconditional expectations of the signal and supply are zero andX, respectively. The sample consists of 14,939 coverage terminations (though the sample size used in our tests will vary depending on the availability of data for the variables of interest). This table reports summary statistics for the market value of equity, share turnover (monthly volume divided by shares outstanding), daily return volatility, and the extent of coverage for each stock in the terminations sample; the CRSP universe (share codes 10 and 11); and the universe of stocks with analyst coverage in the union of the Reuters and I/B/E/S databases. For each firm in the terminations sample, we calculate equity value and turnover in the month prior to the first termination date. For the universes of CRSP stocks and covered stocks, these are first computed as monthly averages for 2002 (the midpoint of our sample period) firm-by-firm and then averaged crosssectionally. Annualized volatility for terminations is the standard deviation of daily continuously compounded returns in the six-month period ending one month prior to a termination, times √252 (a sample firm is omitted from this calculation if it has fewer than three months, or 66 trading days, of non-missing returns.) For the universes of CRSP stocks and covered stocks, volatilities are the annualized daily standard deviations for firms in these samples during calendar year 2002. We exclude firms with fewer than 200 nonmissing return observations in the CRSP database. The number of brokers covering a stock in our terminations sample over the three months prior to the drop is based on combining data from the Reuters and I/B/E/S datasets. The broker count for the universe of covered stocks represents the number of unique brokers that covered each stock in the Reuters or I/B/E/S databases during the three months prior to June 30, 2002. The broker counts are then averaged cross-sectionally. , and report the cross-sectional mean.
We also report the mean percentage change (DiD/mean before -1). Panel A reports the mean probability of informed trading for stocks in the termination sample in the quarters immediately preceding and following the quarter in which the coverage termination occurred. We use Stephen Brown's quarterly PIN estimates. Panel B reports changes in bid-ask spreads. Spreads are computed as (ask-bid)/(ask+bid)/2 using daily closing bid and ask data from CRSP. This and the next two statistics are averaged over six-month and 12-month windows ending 10 days prior to the termination announcement or starting 10 days after the announcement date. Panel C reports changes in the log Amihud illiquidity measure. This is defined as the natural log of the ratio of the absolute stock return to the dollar trading volume and scaled by 10 6 ; see Amihud (2002, p. 43) . Panel D reports the changes in the number of days with zero or missing returns in CRSP (using missing return codes -66, -77, -88, and -99) . Panel E reports the effects of terminations on quarterly earnings announcements. The first measure is the log of daily return volatility in a three-day window around earnings announcements for all earnings announcements occurring in a one-year window before or after the drop. The second measure is the mean absolute value of quarterly earnings surprises in a one-year window before or after the drop. A surprise is defined as the absolute value of actual quarterly earnings minus the latest I/B/E/S consensus estimate before the earnings announcement, scaled by book value of equity per share, and multiplied by 100 for expositional purposes. Earnings surprise cannot be computed for orphaned stocks. To adjust for potential cross-sectional dependence due to overlapping estimation windows, p-values for the difference-in-difference tests are calculated using a block bootstrap (with optimal block length chosen according to the optimality criterion of Politis and White (2004) We test whether a brokerage firm terminates sector coverage selectively based on the sector's past or future performance, which would undermine our claim that sector terminations contain no information relevant to the valuation of the stocks that lose coverage. The test is based on a McFadden (1974) choice model. We model a brokerage firm's choice of which sectors to stop covering at time t. To be included in the estimation sample, we require that the brokerage firm drop at least one sector at time t (so we model the choice of which sectors are terminated conditional on the firm's decision to downsize research). We exclude brokerage firms that close down their research departments altogether (i.e., those that drop every sector they cover). For each broker, the choice set from which sector terminations are drawn includes all sectors the broker covers at time t. The unit of analysis is hence a broker-sector pair. The dependent variable equals one if a sector is chosen for termination and zero otherwise. Brokers are assumed to select those sectors whose termination will maximize their expected profit. Sectors are defined using six-digit GICS codes and sector terminations are identified from the sources described in Section II. The explanatory variables are defined as follows. Prior and future sector performance is measured two ways. The first uses average market-adjusted cumulative returns in the sector over the twelve months before and after the decision date, respectively, using the CRSP value-weight index to make the market adjustment. The second uses prior and future sector earnings surprises are measured as realized quarterly earnings per share minus consensus (i.e., median) forecasts and scaled by book value of equity per share, averaged over the prior four or next four quarters, respectively, and across stocks in the same GICS code. Sector characteristics include return volatility (measured over the prior twelve months and averaged across stocks in the same GICS); a proxy for competition from other brokers (the log of one plus the number of other brokers covering the sector during the three months preceding the termination decision); and two proxies for the fee income a sector generates for the brokerage firm in question, in the form of trading commissions and investment banking fees. To proxy for trading commissions, we compute the log aggregate dollar trading volume of only those stocks in a sector that the brokerage firm covered in the month before the termination decision. Sectors in which the brokerage firm covers few stocks, or with covered stocks that are associated with low dollar trading volumes, generate lower trading commissions. To proxy for the investment banking fees a brokerage firm earns in a given sector, we compute the log of the aggregate equity proceeds raised in the 12 months prior to a termination decision by those companies in the sector whose stocks were covered by the brokerage firm's analyst and for which the brokerage firm acted as the lead underwriter. (We use data for the prior 12 months since equity issuance is a relatively rare event.) Analyst characteristics include a dummy equal to one if the analyst covering the sector was ranked first, second, or third in his sector in the annual Institutional Investor (II) all-star rankings (as of the October issue preceding the sector termination); the analyst's forecast accuracy relative to his sector-matched peers at other brokerage firms (constructed as in Hong and Kubik (2003) ); his experience (the log of one plus the number of years the analyst has contributed forecasts to I/B/E/S); and his tenure with the broker (the log of one plus the number of years the analyst has worked for this brokerage firm). Where more than one analyst covers a sector, we compute the maximum value across team members, though our results are not sensitive to this coding. The model is estimated using probit without (column 1) or with random brokerage-firm effects (column 2). In column (1), standard errors are clustered within brokerage firms to reduce the influence of overlapping observations. The randomeffects probit in column (2) cannot accommodate clustered standard errors. We use *** , ** , * , and † to denote statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. In addition to the probit coefficients, we report marginal effects as well as economic effects (i.e., marginal effects times a one-standard deviation change in continuous covariates). , that is, the difference between the pre-and post-termination change for sample stock i less the average change for control stocks. We also report percentage changes (DiD/mean before -1). Control groups are formed as described in Table II . Panel A reports these statistics for the entire sample of coverage terminations. Panel B restricts the sample to closure-related terminations. Panel C provides a breakdown by the number of other brokers covering the stock in the three months preceding the coverage termination, using the whole sample. The 13f data are taken from Thomson Financial's CDA/Spectrum database. We lose 2,342 events involving stocks that do not satisfy DGTW's data conditions and 29 events with missing 13f data for either the sample firm or the controls. To adjust for potential crosssectional dependence due to overlapping estimation windows, p-values for the difference-in-difference tests are calculated using a block bootstrap (with optimal block length chosen according to the optimality criterion of Politis and White (2004) We test the cross-sectional predictions of the model presented in Section I by regressing Fama-French-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around coverage terminations on proxies for δ (the fraction of informed investors); X (mean aggregate supply); (aggregate supply uncertainty); (payoff uncertainty); and (signal noise). The main proxy for δ is the fraction of the company's stock held by institutional investors as of the quarter-end prior to the termination, estimated from 13f data. In column (3), we add the size of the brokerage firm's sales force (i.e., the number of registered representatives), taken from the Factbook of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and dated January 1 of the termination year. Mean and variance of aggregate supply are based on the first two moments of the distribution of log daily turnover, estimated over the six months ending one month prior to the termination. Our proxy for payoff variance is the standard deviation of the year-on-year growth rate in quarterly earnings per share, using up to 20 quarters of data prior to the termination. We parameterize signal noise as a function of the number of remaining analysts covering the stock; three proxies for the quality of the analyst whose coverage is lost (see Table III ); and (in column 4) the level and square of analyst forecast dispersion, defined as the time-series mean of the standard deviation of analyst EPS forecasts in the year prior to the termination, scaled by book value per share. Where necessary, variables are winsorized to reduce noise and avoid outliers driving the results. We control for whether the termination coincides with a negative earnings surprise and for announcement-quarter effects. (The latter are not reported to conserve space.) Column (2) restricts the sample to closurerelated terminations. Standard errors, clustered on CRSP perm numbers, are reported in italics beneath the coefficient estimates. We use *** , ** , * , and † to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. We test the cross-sectional predictions of the model presented in Section I by regressing a proxy for changes in informed demand around coverage terminations on proxies for δ (the fraction of informed investors); X (mean aggregate supply);
(aggregate supply uncertainty) (payoff uncertainty); and (signal noise). Our proxy for the change in informed demand is the difference-in-difference (DiD) change in the fraction of the company's stock held by institutional investors from the quarter before to the quarter after a coverage termination, net of the mean contemporaneous change in institutional holdings in matched control firms. See Table V for details of the construction. The proxies for the independent covariates are as defined in Table VI . We also control for whether the termination coincides with a negative earnings surprise and for announcement-quarter effects. (The latter are not reported to conserve space.) As in Table V , we lose 2,342 events involving stocks that do not satisfy DGTW's data conditions and 29 events with missing 13f data for either the sample firm or the controls. The number of observations used in each regression depends on data availability for the proxies. Column (2) restricts the sample to closure-related terminations. Standard errors, clustered on CRSP perm numbers, are reported in italics beneath the coefficient estimates. We use *** , ** , * , and † to denote statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
